Cognitive workload measurement and modeling under divided attention by Castro, SC et al.
Running head: COGNITIVE WORKLOAD MEASUREMENT  
 
 
 
 
 
Cognitive Workload Measurement and Modeling Under Divided Attention 
 
Spencer C. Castro1 
David L. Strayer1 
Dora Matzke2 
 Andrew Heathcote3 
 
 
 
Author Note: 
1, Department of Psychology, University of Utah 
2, Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam 
3, Division of Psychology, University of Tasmania 
 
This research was supported in part by the National Science Foundation Graduate Research 
Fellowship Program, the AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety, the Veni grant (451-15-010) from 
the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), ARC DP160101891, and 
CERA247. 
 
 
 
Word Count: 9088 
 
 
 
 
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Spencer Castro, Department of 
Psychology, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84112 
Email contact: spencer.castro@psych.utah.edu 
  
COGNITIVE WORKLOAD MEASUREMENT 2 
Abstract 
Motorists often engage in secondary tasks unrelated to driving that increase cognitive workload, 
resulting in fatal crashes and injuries. An International Standards Organization (ISO) method for 
measuring a driver’s cognitive workload, the Detection Response Task (DRT), correlates well 
with driving outcomes, but investigation of its putative theoretical basis in terms of finite 
attention capacity remains limited. We address this knowledge gap using evidence-accumulation 
modeling of simple and choice versions of the DRT in a driving scenario. Our experiments 
demonstrate how dual-task load affects the parameters of evidence-accumulation models. We 
found that the cognitive workload induced by a secondary task (counting backward by threes) 
reduced the rate of evidence accumulation, consistent with rates being sensitive to limited-
capacity attention. We also found a compensatory increase in the amount of evidence required 
for a response and a small speeding in the time for non-decision processes. The ISO version of 
the DRT was found to be most sensitive to cognitive workload. A Wald-distributed evidence-
accumulation model augmented with a parameter measuring response omissions provided a 
parsimonious measure of the underlying causes of cognitive workload in this task. This work 
demonstrates that evidence-accumulation modeling can accurately represent data produced by 
cognitive workload measurements, reproduce the data through simulation, and provide 
supporting evidence for the cognitive processes underlying cognitive workload. Our results 
provide converging evidence that the DRT method is sensitive to dynamic fluctuations in 
limited-capacity attention.  
Public Significance Statement: People around the world endanger the lives of themselves and 
others every day by dividing their attention across multiple tasks, such as driving and talking on 
a cell phone. These dangers result from splitting and overtaxing our limited voluntary attentional 
efforts. Current tools for measuring attentional effort, also known as cognitive workload, lack 
insight into cognitive factors that can cause fatal errors. With the advent of new distracting 
technology in cars, if we do not effectively measure cognitive workload fatal human errors may 
grow. To quantify cognitive workload under a simulated driving-like task, the current study 
details our application of mathematical modeling to an International Standard for measuring 
ongoing cognitive workload in the vehicle. This research provides a framework for accurately 
quantifying cognitive workload and the factors that contribute to it, which will allow future 
researchers and policy makers to determine the danger inherent in many tasks within the vehicle.  
    
Keywords: Detection Response Task, Driving Simulation, Wald Distribution, Independent Race 
Model, Cognitive Workload, Evidence Accumulation Modeling, Attention, Human Performance, 
Multitasking, Dual Task Cost 
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The capacity limits of human cognition play a central role in performing everyday 
activities. These limits of capacity affect psychological constructs from self-regulation (e.g., 
Muraven & Baumeister, 2000) to the prevalence of stereotyping (e.g., Biernat, Kobrynowicz, & 
Weber, 2003), but they become most apparent under divided attention: when people attempt to 
perform more than one cognitive activity at the same time (e.g., driving an automobile and using 
a smartphone). Performing these tasks requires cognitive effort, or a mental workload that must 
be maintained to achieve the concurrent goals. Hart and Staveland (1988) define mental 
workload as the “…relationship between the amount of mental processing capability or resources 
and the amount required by the task”. Based on this view of workload, Strayer, Watson, and 
Drews (2011) emphasize cognitive sources of distraction to distinguish them from visual and 
manual components, which all contribute to overall workload. They argue that divided attention, 
such as when driving and talking on a cell phone, decreases performance in both tasks largely 
due to the cognitive component of workload. 
Although robust, the precise cause of cognitive workload’s effect on performance under 
divided attention is less well understood. On the one-hand, declines in performance may stem 
from reductions in the efficiency of information processing, perhaps due to a competition for a 
limited pool of resource (i.e., cognitive capacity). On the other hand, declines in performance 
may reflect a bias to more conservative responding under higher cognitive workload (i.e., 
response caution).  Though it is often difficult to distinguish between these alternative 
interpretations, this distinction has important implications for theories of attention in complex 
multitasking situations. In the former, the rate of information processing is slowed by 
multitasking. In the latter, the threshold amount of information required for decisions is 
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increased by multitasking. Given the ubiquity of multitasking in modern society, this distinction 
also has important real-world consequences. 
For example, the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) 
found that at any given time over 10% of drivers are using a cellular device (NHTSA, 2016). 
Although NHTSA (2012, 2016) guidelines currently cover only visual and manual sources of 
distraction, Klauer et al. (2014) demonstrated that deficits in attention—largely caused by the 
cognitive workload required to drive and perform secondary tasks such as using a mobile 
device—are a leading factor in the majority of crashes and near-crashes. Castro, (2017) 
demonstrated that mobile devices of different sizes, whether they are handheld or mounted, 
differentially affect attention to changes beyond the device. Depending upon the specific 
mechanisms underlying cognitive workload’s impact on crash risk, studies measuring cognitive 
workload may recommend different solutions to ameliorate these risks. If cell phone use impacts 
the rate of information a driver is capable of processing, then strategies and policies that optimize 
a driver’s allocation of limited resources to the road are warranted. However, if drivers change 
their behavior by requiring more information from their environment before making decisions, 
then perhaps updated driver training may be recommended to decrease decision time. Of the two 
outcomes, previous research would seem to support theories of limited resources and deficits 
resulting from the rate of information processing; however, this assumption has yet to be 
rigorously evaluated. 
Theoretical models of human psychological-performance limitations stem largely from 
research on the role of attention in goal-directed behavior. Kahneman (1973) describes 
voluntary, goal-directed attention as a finite capacity that limits information processing speed. In 
resource theories (e.g., Navon & Gopher, 1979), capacity is shared among tasks operating in 
parallel, with the processing rate for each proportional to its attention allocation. In single-
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channel bottleneck theories (e.g., Welford, 1952) attention is interleaved, switching in an all-or-
none manner among tasks, with each task's average processing rate proportional to the attention 
it receives. This theory has been applied to driving utilizing Welford’s (1952) Psychological 
Refractory Period (PRP) paradigm. Levy, Pashler, and Boer (2006) demonstrated that the PRP is 
evident in the driving context by demonstrating slowed brake reaction times (RTs) when 
occurring shortly after an auditory discrimination stimulus. The researchers varied the stimulus-
onset asynchrony (SOA) between the auditory stimulus and requiring the participant to brake, 
showing that brake RT increased with shorter SOAs. This paradigm demonstrates that dual-task 
performance leads to serial processing of discrete stimuli and responses. However, it has a 
somewhat limited application to driving, which can be categorized as a slightly automated, 
cognitively demanding continuous task. The potentially distracting secondary tasks provide 
intermittent dual tasking, but they occur in parallel with the primary continuous task of driving. 
PRP designs require two discrete responses and do not seem to be the best candidate for 
measuring ongoing driving performance decrements induced by cognitive workload. Their 
secondary tone task should be sufficient to predict any driving performance issues and would be 
sufficient with the approach outlined in this paper. In both theories, attention-degrading 
secondary tasks produce a load that detracts from primary-task performance. Strayer and Fisher 
(2016) argue that load induced by cognitive sources of distraction in driving account for failures 
to notice objects in the fovea (Strayer & Drews, 2007), increased brake reaction time (Caird, 
Willness, Steel, & Scialfa, 2008), failures to stop at intersections (Strayer, Watson, & Drews, 
2011), and decreased visual scanning (Taylor et al., 2013). 
The Detection Response Task (DRT) was developed by the International Standards 
Organization (ISO) to measure the potentially lethal and difficult to quantify cognitive workload 
effects of secondary tasks (ISO DIS 17488, 2015). It provides a simple measurement of cognitive 
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workload that directly correlates with good driving performance (Strayer et al., 2015), 
retrospective subjective workload measures (Hart & Staveland, 1988), and electrophysiology 
(Strayer et al., 2015). The DRT requires a button press in response to an easily-detected stimulus 
that occurs randomly every 3-5 seconds. Increased secondary-task load causes slowing in DRT 
response time and/or an increased response omission rate (Castro, Cooper, & Strayer, 2016; 
Cooper, Castro, & Strayer, 2016; Strayer, Biondi, & Cooper, 2017). Recently, the NHTSA has 
taken note of the DRT's efficacy and practicality and plans to incorporate it into their Driver 
Distraction Guidelines (Ranney, Baldwin, Smith, Mazzae, & Pierce, 2014). 
 ISO DIS 17488 (2015) claims that with appropriate apparatus (i.e., stimuli and responses 
that do not overlap with other tasks) the DRT has only minimal effects on driving. The typical 
DRT manipulation employed by researchers consists of baseline driving (driving + DRT) and 
then driving with a secondary task (driving + DRT + secondary task). This experimental design 
enables comparisons that quantify the cognitive workload of the secondary task but do not 
directly address the DRT’s impact on driving performance. Previous studies have found mixed 
results for the effect of the DRT alone on driving (e.g., Ranney, Baldwin, Smith, Mazzae, & 
Pierce, 2014; Strayer et al., 2015). Castro, Cooper, and Strayer (2016) developed a simulated 
steering task that allows more sensitive measurement and concluded that there is a small effect of 
the DRT. Although this effect is usually inconsequential for real driving performance, it is 
theoretically important, as it is consistent with the idea of capacity sharing between the DRT and 
other tasks.  
Even though it is increasingly adopted as a standard for making critical judgments, such 
as deciding how to instrument cars and rank their safety (Strayer et al., 2015), validation of the 
DRT has been mostly empirical, with only a few investigations of its theoretical underpinnings 
(Ratcliff & Strayer, 2014; Tillman, Strayer, Eidels, & Heathcote, 2017). Given the importance of 
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assessing cognitive workload and the allocation of attention in a wide variety of dynamic 
environments, understanding what the DRT is measuring is important in both basic and applied 
contexts. We expanded this line of research using the DRT and evidence-accumulation 
modeling. Evidence-accumulation modeling is a theoretical framework that has been 
successfully applied to understand speeded responding in a wide range of choice tasks that 
require the selection of a set of two or more response options (Brown & Heathcote, 2008; Leite 
& Ratcliff, 2010), and less widely to simple tasks like the DRT requiring only one response (e.g., 
Ratcliff, 2015). For both simple and choice tasks, this framework assumes an initial encoding 
stage that extracts evidence from a stimulus. Next, an accumulation stage accrues evidence until 
it reaches a threshold amount, at which point a final response-production stage is initiated. 
Response time (RT) equals the time to reach threshold (decision time) plus non-decision time, 
which is the sum of encoding and response production times. 
Evidence-accumulation modeling allows for a more fine-grained representation of the 
mechanisms underlying the impacts of secondary tasks on driving, and thus can improve the 
validity of DRT studies. In particular, these models incorporate parameters representing the rate 
of information processing (i.e., drift rates), lower level perceptual and motor influences (i.e., 
non-decision times) and higher order strategic caution and bias processes (i.e., response 
thresholds). A variety of evidence-accumulation models have been proposed that although 
sharing a set of core assumptions and parameters, differ in some details. We employed two 
different models, the LBA (Brown & Heathcote, 2008) and Wald (Leite & Ratcliff, 2010), in 
order to check if these differences in detail influenced the inferences we made about underlying 
mechanisms based on their core parameters. We found that both models led to the same 
conclusions and we focus on the Wald model here. It provided a slightly better model of our data 
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and it has been more often used with the DRT, so it better supports comparisons to previous 
results. LBA results are reported in Supplementary Materials.    
Figure 1 illustrates an evidence-accumulation model of the DRT, where the evidence 
total (dashed line) is stochastic (i.e., varying from moment-to-moment) and increasing at a mean 
rate v towards a threshold b. This is called a Wald” model because, assuming infinitesimal 
Gaussian moment-to-moment variability, the distribution of decision times follows a positively 
skewed Wald distribution, which in combination with a shift (non-decision time) parameter 
provides a good description of simple RT (Heathcote, 2004). It can be extended to model choice 
tasks by having an accumulator independently gathering evidence for each option, with the first 
to reach its threshold causing the corresponding response to be selected (Leite & Ratcliff, 2010).     
COGNITIVE WORKLOAD MEASUREMENT 9 
 
Figure 1. The Wald evidence-accumulation model for the DRT. Note the dashed evidence 
accumulation path is a caricature and would in reality vary more rapidly.  
 
Given that cognitive workload is thought to affect the rate of information processing, it 
naturally maps to evidence-accumulation rate parameters. However, Heathcote, Loft, and 
Remington (2015) demonstrated in the domain of prospective memory—which was thought to 
slow performance of a primary or ongoing task because of capacity sharing with a monitoring 
process required to achieve a prospective-memory goal—that slowing of task performance 
stemmed primarily from individuals delaying ongoing responses to make it less likely that they 
pre-empted the response required by the prospective-memory goal. This conclusion called into 
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question prevailing limited-capacity theories of prospective memory (see also Strickland, Loft, 
Remington & Heathcote, 2017, in press).  
In the domain of cognitive workload, it is possible that effects are mediated by threshold 
changes and/or changes in a number of other factors. Increased cognitive workload may slow 
early perceptual encoding, and hence non-decision time, or even cause failures to encode 
evidence from the stimulus, and hence response omissions. Previous studies of perceptual choice 
tasks claim that visual-attention-load effects are reflected in accumulation rates (Eidels, Donkin, 
Brown, & Heathcote, 2010). Schmiedek et al. (2007) correlated individual differences on a 
variety of tasks (e.g., working memory, reasoning, and psychometric speed) and evidence-
accumulation rates in verbal, numeric and spatial choice paradigms as reflecting attention 
capacity as well. Cognitive workload may also affect the quality of evidence, which is inversely 
proportional to the level of noise in evidence; in choice tasks it is directly proportional to the 
difference between evidence for the different options. Lower quality evidence can result in 
choice errors unless evidence is collected for a longer time, and so may indirectly cause slowing 
if participants raise their threshold to maintain accuracy (i.e., a "speed-accuracy tradeoff).  
In tasks like the DRT where there is only one response, higher noise in evidence 
associated with reduced attention may also cause false detection responses (e.g., due to moment-
to-moment fluctuations that occur even when no stimulus is present), and so again participants 
may have to set larger thresholds with the increased cognitive workload. Alternatively, higher 
thresholds may reflect a general tendency to be more cautious when making responses in more 
demanding situations (Strickland et al., 2017; Tillman et al., 2017). Consequently, it is an open 
question as to which aspects of information processing are altered under divided attention and 
exactly what aspects of information processing are being measured by the DRT methodology. 
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Experiment 
Cognitive workload effects are prototypically measured in dual-task paradigms, by 
contrasting primary-task performance between conditions with and without a secondary task that 
is attention demanding, but which does not overlap with the primary task regarding perceptual 
and motor components. We performed such a dual-task experiment with eight conditions (see 
Table 1), with a driving-like primary task (Castro et al.’s 2016 steering task) common to all. In 
four of the eight conditions participants also performed a secondary task of counting backward 
by threes. The four conditions with a secondary task and four conditions without a secondary 
task differed in the same way with respect to requirements related to the DRT. In a baseline 
condition there was no DRT, and so no cognitive workload measurement was taken. In a second 
condition, cognitive workload was measured with a typical ISO DRT to a bright light. In a third 
condition, the DRT used a dimmer light, and in a fourth condition cognitive workload was 
measured with a choice version of the DRT, where participants had to press one of two buttons 
to indicate whether the light was dim or bright. We hypothesized that the secondary-task load 
would slow DRT responding and increase errors (i.e., missed responses and also incorrect 
responses in the choice DRT). From past work on visual workload and individual differences, we 
hypothesized that the secondary task would reduce evidence accumulation rates in the DRT, and 
also increase thresholds and non-decision times. 
Method 
Participants 
 After Institutional Review Board approval, twenty participants (17-28 years old, 
M=20.2) were recruited via psychology courses at the University of Utah (10 males, 10 females) 
and were compensated for class credit upon completion of two two-hour sessions on different 
days. All reported normal visual acuity and normal color vision. Each participant completed a 
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large number of trials per condition as this, and not the number of participants, was critical for 
parameter estimation (see supplementary materials for parameter recovery, showing that we had 
adequate sample size and data quality). 
Materials 
 
 
Figure 2.  Photograph A shows the simulator used to display the pursuit-tracking task utilizing 
the steering wheel and center screen. Participants control the triangle in an attempt to keep its 
lateral position equivalent to the circle’s lateral position. Photograph B shows the dash-mounted 
DRT for displaying the dim and bright simple DRT, and choice DRT, stimuli.  
 
A 101.6 cm Samsung LCD (1920 x 1080 pixels) was used to display the pursuit-tracking 
task (see Figure 2). Participants utilized a steering wheel from a driving simulator to track a ball 
that moved continuously on the screen with a triangle cursor (see Figure 2A). The ball had a 
diameter of 20 pixels (~0.96 cm), which was the same length as the sides of the equilateral 
triangle cursor. The steering wheel updated the location of the cursor through a Sparkfun™ 
Electronics rotary encoder set to sample the position at 30 Hz. The DRT device presented a dash-
mounted light at two intensities of red (see Figure 2B). Stimuli were presented randomly every 
3-5 seconds and responses were made by pressing one of two micro-switches attached to 
participants’ left and right thumbs.  
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Design 
The pursuit-tracking task was created to simulate steering on a moderately curvy road. 
Participants were instructed to maintain the cursor as close as possible to a ball that moved 
horizontally across the screen at a slow constant rate of 100 pixels per second (see Figure 2A). 
As the ball approached the edge of the screen, it became more probable that the ball would 
reverse direction and maintain its constant movement in the other direction. The probability of 
the ball's location followed a normal distribution centered on the middle of the screen, so that, 
for example, the ball moved smoothly through the center third of the screen (corresponding to 
one standard deviation either side of the middle) approximately 68% of the time, and the center 
two thirds approximately 95% of the time (corresponding to two standard deviations either side 
of the middle).  
There were four pursuit tracking conditions: single-task tracking (i.e., DRT absent), and 
tracking while concurrently making a detection response to the onset of a low-intensity (i.e., 
dim) light, a high-intensity (i.e., bright) light, or a choice response to a dim vs. bright light (see 
Table 1). These conditions were crossed fully with a cognitive workload (i.e., load) manipulation 
of either counting backward by threes (i.e., load present) or not counting (i.e., load absent; see 
Table 1).  The 4 x 2 factorial design was blocked into 64 one-minute runs and counterbalanced 
using a balanced Latin-Square design. Participants were given 30 seconds of rest between each 
block. Apart from single-task tracking (i.e., DRT absent), there were an average of 240 DRT 
trials for each cell of the design. 
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Table 1 
Experimental Design with Factors DRT Stimulus Type (4) x Cognitive Workload (2). 
Cognitive Workload 
DRT Type 
DRT Absent 
Simple 
Choice 
Bright Light Dim Light 
Absent DRT Absent 
Load Absent 
DRT Bright 
Load Absent 
DRT Dim 
Load Absent 
DRT Choice 
Load Absent 
Present DRT Absent 
Load Present 
DRT Bright 
Load Present 
DRT Dim 
Load Present 
DRT Choice 
Load Present 
 
Choice Difficulty Calibration  
Before the experiment, the lights were calibrated so that each participant was 
approximately 75% accurate in their choice classification based on calibration algorithms 
proposed in Macmillan and Creelman (2005). The ISO DRT has a brightness range for its light 
emitting diodes (LEDs) from 0 (off) to 255 (brightest) (ISO DIS 17488, 2015). We initially set 
the values of the bright and dim lights to 200 and 100 respectively. Participants made sets of 8 
choice responses; then the dim light was changed by the proportion correct multiplied by a 
weight that decreased for each set of 8 responses from 150% toward 0% in progressively smaller 
amounts (see Figure 3). When participants scored below 75% the light difference was increased 
by the weighted amount. Participants proceeded to the main experiment when 75% accuracy was 
achieved for three consecutive blocks, with light intensities after that remaining fixed. 
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Figure 3.  Following Figure 11.6 of Macmillan and Creelman (2005), a calibration procedure of 
13 steps for a hypothetical participant. The weight decreases according to the inverse power law 𝑓(𝑥) = 	𝐶𝑥−1/2, where C is a constant truncating the weight at 150%, and x corresponds to the 
step number. The percentages refer to the accuracy averaged over 8 trials. 
 
Measures 
 RT to the dashboard light was recorded to the nearest millisecond. RTs shorter than 150 
milliseconds and trials with two or more responses were excluded from the analyses (0.78%). 
Also, blocks with fewer than 8 presented DRT trials over the course of a 1-minute block were 
removed (1.2%), as were blocks with lower than 50% accuracy, or lower than 50% responses 
(0.76%, 0.09%, respectively). The Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) of the pursuit-tracking 
task was computed from differences between the position of the cursor and the target sampled at 
30 Hz. The RMSE was calculated with the following formula: 
𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 =	0∑ (y3 − 𝑦5)67589 𝑛  
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where the sum is of 1 to n observations (i.e., ~1780) taken over the course of an ~1-minute block 
of the lateral position of the cursor (𝑦) minus the position of the target (𝑦) in each 30th of a 
second interval. The pursuit-tracking task failed to record for three participants, resulting in a 
loss of data. Any RMSE tracking error recorded 3 standard deviations above the individual 
participant's mean was also removed (1.20%). 
Results 
All analyses used R (R Development Core Team, 2016)1. We first report conventional 
analyses of tracking error, the proportion of omissions, accuracy and mean RT using the lme4 
package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). Table 2 describes which measures were 
available in each condition. Participants were included as a random effect, and we used Type II 
Wald chi-square tests. We report 95% confidence intervals in square brackets. Table 3 contains a 
summary of omissions, accuracy, and RT-mean comparisons. 
Table 2 
Presence (+) of dependent variables for the different DRT Types. 
Dependent Variable 
DRT Type 
DRT Absent 
Simple 
Choice 
Bright Light Dim Light 
Pursuit Tracking + + + + 
Omissions  + + + 
Response Time  + + + 
Choice Accuracy    + 
                                                             
1 We have provided our dataset, analyses, and our custom software as a public project on the Open Science 
Framework (https://osf.io/e8kag/). We have provided a template for future modeling of cognitive workload 
measurements with the models utilized within this repository. 
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Pursuit Tracking Measures 
Cognitive Workload. Collapsing across DRT types, RMSE steering error was greater for 
the load-present condition (M = 2.23, [2.21, 2.24]) than the load-absent condition (M = 2.16, 
[2.14, 2.17]), c2(1) = 157.92, p < .001.  
DRT Type. Collapsing across the cognitive workload manipulation, we performed 
pairwise comparisons of the four DRT Types to their closest performer. The bright (i.e., ISO 
standard) DRT increased steering error (M = 2.15, [2.14, 2.17]) over the single-task condition 
(i.e., DRT absent; M = 1.97, [1.96, 1.99]), t(16) = 3.83, p = .001, [.08, .28], but had a 
significantly smaller steering error than the dim DRT condition (M = 2.22, [2.20, 2.23]), t(16) = 
4.58, p < .001, [.03, .09]). The choice DRT (M = 2.38, [2.36, 2.39]) significantly increased 
steering error over the dim DRT condition as well, t(16) = 3.65, p = .002, [.06, .24].   
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Figure 4.  Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) for the tracking task. Error bars are 95% 
confidence intervals around the mean utilizing the Cousineau-Morey method (Cousineau, 2005; 
Morey, 2008; Baguley, 2012). 
Additionally, the average size of the load effect across the simple DRTs (i.e., bright and 
dim DRTs) did not differ significantly from the load effect in the DRT-absent condition t(16) = 
0.75, p = .46, [-.09, .22], but the load effect with the addition of the choice task was significantly 
smaller t(16) = 2.80, p = .005, [.07, .28], driving an interaction between load and the addition of 
different DRTs c2(3) = 14.75, p = .002 [.02, .10] (see Figure 4).  
DRT Measures 
 
 DRT measures came from the bright and dim simple DRT, and choice DRT types. For 
our analyses, these DRT types were sometimes grouped as simple (bright, dim) vs. choice. These 
measures include the percent of omissions, (i.e., failures to respond within 3 seconds after 
stimulus presentation), RT, and the percent of correct light discriminations in the case of the 
choice task (see Table 2). 
Omissions.  We combined data from the bright and dim DRTs to make a 2 (DRT type) ´ 
2 (cognitive workload) design. For the simple DRTs, omission rates were lower when in the 
load-absent condition (M = 4.30%, [3.70, 4.89]) than the load-present condition (M = 5.96%, 
[5.24, 6.67]), c2(1) = 18.66, p < .001. Neither the effect of stimulus type, nor its interaction with 
load, was significant. For the same design – but replacing the simple conditions with the two-
alternative choice task – load also significantly affected omission rates, c2(1) = 36.64, p < .001. 
Participants failed to respond more often in the load-present condition (M = 3.60%, [2.73, 4.47]) 
than when in the load-absent condition (M = 1.31%, [.80, 1.83]), but neither the effect of 
stimulus type, nor its interaction with load, was significant. The increase in omissions due to load 
was significantly greater for the choice (2.00%, [1.57, 3.01]) than the simple DRT (1.10%, [.96, 
2.36]), c2(1) = 10.62, p = .001 (see Figure 5).  
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Figure 5. Percent omissions (failures to respond) to DRT stimuli. The size of the cognitive 
workload effect differed between the simple DRTs (i.e., Bright and Dim) and the choice DRT. 
Error bars are 95% confidence intervals around the mean utilizing the Cousineau-Morey method 
(Cousineau, 2005; Morey, 2008; Baguley, 2012). 
 
 Response Time. We again combined data from the two simple DRTs to make a 2´2 
design and transformed the RT data to the log scale for analysis, but report means on the seconds 
scale (see Figure 6). Participants responded 0.146 s slower in the load-present condition (M = 
0.622 s, [.614, .631]) than the load-absent condition (M = 0.479 s, [.472, .483]), c2(1) = 1711.95, 
p < .01. The main effect of stimulus was also significant, c2(1) = 37.43, p < .001, but participants 
were only 0.018 s slower for the dim stimulus (M = 0.555 s, [.546, .561]) compared to the bright 
stimulus (M = 0.539 s, [.529, .543]). The two effects did not interact significantly. 
In the choice DRT, participants responded 0.098 s slower in the load-present condition 
(M = .966 s, [.951, .980]) than in the load-absent condition (M = .868 s, [.856, .881]), c2(1) = 
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230.49, p < .001. The main effect of stimulus was again significant, c2(1) = 5.64, p = .018, but 
small—0.019 s slower for the dim stimulus (M = .923 s, [.909, .937]) compared to the bright 
stimulus (M = .904 s, [.891, .917])—and again the two effects did not interact significantly. We 
also found that participants were 0.049 s slower overall on error trials (M = .951 s, [.929, .973]) 
compared to correct trials (M = .902 s, [.891, .912]), c2(1) = 34.04, p < .001. 
Overall, the simple DRT was much quicker than the choice DRT (M = .545 s, [.540, .550] 
vs .913 s, [.904 0.923]), c2(1) = 212.00, p < .001, and the increase in mean response time due to 
load was significantly greater for the simple (M = .151 s, [.140, .162]) than the choice (M = .102 
s, [.088, .116]) DRT, c2(1) = 212.13, p < .001.  
 
Figure 6. Response time for the average of simple DRT conditions and the choice DRT. Error 
bars are 95% confidence intervals around the mean utilizing the Cousineau-Morey method 
(Cousineau, 2005; Morey, 2008; Baguley, 2012). 
 
Choice Accuracy. Participants were more accurate in the load-absent condition (M = 
77.40%, [75.48, 79.27]) than in the load-present condition (M = 74.60%, [72.15, 76.70]), c2(1) = 
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9.28, p = .002), but neither the effect of stimulus type, nor its interaction with the load effect, was 
significant (see Table 3 for a summary). 
Table 3 
Means and Standard Deviations for stimulus type (2) by Cognitive Workload (2) for the simple 
and choice tasks. 
Task Dependent Variable Stimulus or Load Mean SD p 
Simpl
e 
Omissions (%) 
Absent-Present 4.6%, 6.2% 9.4%, 8.0% <.01 
Bright-Dim 5.4%, 5.3% 8.8%, 8.5% .40 
Response Time 
(s) 
Absent-Present .48 s, .62 s .19 s, .21 s <.01 
Bright-Dim .54 s, .56 s .18 s, .20 s <.01 
Choic
e 
Omissions (%) 
Absent-Present 1.3%, 3.6% 1.1%, 3.4% <.01 
Bright-Dim 2.1%, 2.7% 1.8%, 2.4% .04 
Response Time 
(s) 
Absent-Present .87 s, .97 s .15 s, .17 s <.01 
Bright-Dim .90 s, .92 s .16 s, .15 s .02 
Accuracy (%) 
Absent-Present 77.4%, 74.6% 6.2%, 6.5% <.01 
Bright-Dim 76.9%, 75.2% 11.8%, 8.8% .08 
 
Discussion 
In summary, the RMSE tracking error and RT measures exhibited an increase with 
cognitive workload and DRT difficulty, but the cognitive workload difference was smaller for 
the choice DRT. With the addition of the choice DRT, both responses to the DRT and RMSE 
tracking error were less affected by the cognitive workload manipulation. Accuracy in the choice 
DRT also decreased with load. 
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We now use evidence-accumulation modeling to understand the underlying causes of the 
behavior we observed. We first introduce the model in a general form that is able to account for 
the choice data, with one accumulator corresponding to a dim choice and the other to a bright 
choice that race independently. The model for the simple DRT is a special case with only one 
accumulator. For both simple and choice models, we add the possibility of variability in the 
starting point of evidence accumulation (see Logan, Van Zandt, Verbruggen, & Wagenmakers, 
2014, for the mathematically equivalent case where the variation is in the threshold).   
Evidence-Accumulation Modeling 
 A major division among evidence-accumulation models is whether they assume that 
accumulation is stochastic within a trial (i.e., the amount added to the evidence total in each 
moment during accumulation has a random component) or deterministic (i.e., the amount added 
in each moment is a constant). We fit a model of each type to the choice data, the deterministic 
LBA (Brown & Heathcote, 2008) and the stochastic racing one-barrier diffusion (Leite & 
Ratcliff, 2010) or Wald model, as illustrated in Figure 7. Our initial fit of the Wald race model 
assumed that the starting point of evidence accumulation varies from trial-to-trial according to a 
uniform distribution, an assumption shared with the LBA. The LBA differs from our Wald 
model in that the rate of evidence accumulation is assumed to vary randomly from trial to trial 
rather than from moment-to-moment within a trial. By fitting both models, we verified that the 
results are not dependent on specific assumptions of either models. As the LBA fits produced 
essentially the same conclusions we report details for the LBA in supplementary materials. 
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Figure 7. The Wald race model for the choice DRT with a dim stimulus and hence a higher rate 
for the matching (dim) accumulator than the mismatching (bright) accumulator. Note the dashed 
evidence accumulation paths are a caricature and would in reality vary more rapidly. 
 
In order to identify the Wald model, we fixed the diffusion coefficient (i.e., the standard 
deviation of the moment-to-moment variability) at 1 and estimated the average rate of 
accumulation (v).  One mean rate was estimated for the accumulator that matched the stimulus 
and a second, typically smaller, mean rate was estimated for the mismatching accumulator. For 
example, Figure 7 illustrates a case where the stimulus was dim and so the dim accumulator has 
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a higher mean rate than the bright accumulator. The starting point of evidence accumulation was 
assumed to vary from trial to trial independently for each accumulator according to a uniform 
distribution on the interval from 0 to an estimated parameter A. We parameterized each 
accumulator’s threshold (b) in terms of the gap from the top of the start-point distribution, B = b 
– A > 0, so accumulation always began above the level of the start-point noise. We estimated 
non-decision time, the sum of the times to encode the stimulus and to produce a response, as 
parameter t0. 
Participants sometimes failed to respond to the DRT, particularly under increased load. 
One possibility is that this occurred because their response was so slow that it did not occur 
before the next DRT stimulus. However, for all participants in all conditions we found the right 
tail of their RT distributions clearly terminated well before the minimum interval between DRT 
stimuli of 3 seconds. This makes it very unlikely that the omissions were due to an ongoing 
decision process being cut off, at least if that decision process is of the same type as the one that 
explains all of the responses that were made. Therefore, we conceptualized response omissions 
as either a perceptual failure to encode the stimulus, akin to inattention blindness during 
distracted driving (Strayer & Drews, 2007), or as a failure to sample evidence from the encoded 
stimulus akin to the idea of “trigger failure” in models of the stop-signal paradigm (Matzke, 
Love & Heathcote, 2017, Matzke et al., 2017).  
In particular, we adopted the standard evidence-accumulation model assumption that, at 
the onset of the stimulus, information transduction occurs through sensory processes that result 
in an internal representation of the relevant evidence (Brown & Heathcote, 2008; Ratcliff & 
McKoon, 2008). Then, the evidence accumulation process accesses this evidence. In the case of 
detection, this evidence consists of a simple change of sufficient magnitude in the attended 
sensory channel (Ratcliff & Van Dongen, 2011). Encoding failure means that either the stimulus 
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did not cause a change of sufficient magnitude, or that it did, but the change was not accessed by 
the evidence accumulation process. In order to account for the probability of these failures we 
augmented the model with a parameter, pf. The omission probability can be directly observed 
and was clearly different between load conditions, and so pf was assumed to vary with load in 
both models. Denoting the likelihood of a response R at time t in the standard models with 
parameter vector q as l(R,t|q), the corresponding likelihood in the augmented model is (1-pf) X 
l(R,t|q), and the probability of an omission is pf.  
In the following sections we report a series of analyses based on fits of this model. We 
first report how several parameterizations of the model were fit to the simple DRT data and to 
the choice DRT data. Tables 4 and 5 report the results of analyses that enable selection of the 
best parameterization for each task type. We then report analyses of the parameters of the 
selected models, and of follow-up model selection and parameter analyses that allow us to 
identify the relative influence of each type of model parameter in explaining load effects. Finally, 
we look at the relationship between model parameters and tracking error. 
Model Estimation and Selection 
Model estimation was carried out in a Bayesian manner using the Differential Evolution 
algorithm (Turner, Sederberg, Brown, & Steyvers, 2013). Priors and sampling methods are 
described in Supplementary Materials. Sampling occurred in two steps. In the first step, sampling 
was carried out separately for individual participants. The results of this step provided the 
starting points for sampling the full hierarchical model, whose results are reported here (see 
Heathcote, Lin, Reynolds, Strickland, Gretton & Matzke, in press). Because we were primarily 
interested in the effects of cognitive workload, for both simple and choice DRTs we estimated 
separate threshold (B), mean rate (v), non-decision time (t0) and omission probability (pf) 
parameters for load-present and load-absent conditions, requiring a total of 8 parameters. We fit 
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the data for the two simple DRTs simultaneously, assuming the same non-decision time and 
omission probability parameters, but allowing different mean accumulation rates for the dim and 
bright stimuli for a total of four estimated mean rate parameters (dim and bright stimuli in load-
present and load-absent conditions), and different boundaries, for a total of four estimated 
threshold parameters (i.e., dim and bright accumulators in load-present and load-absent 
conditions). For the choice DRT there were also four threshold parameters (allowing for 
response bias through different dim and bright accumulator boundaries in each of the load-
present and load-absent conditions) but eight mean rate parameters, four for the matching 
accumulator (for dim and bright stimuli in load-present and load-absent conditions) and a 
corresponding four parameters for the mismatching accumulator.  
We also compared three models that differed on whether start point noise (see Figure 7) 
was assumed to either be absent (i.e., A = 0), the same for all conditions and accumulators, or the 
same for all conditions but different between accumulators. Start point variability was selected 
for the simple DRT task, but not for the choice task. This outcome suggest that in the simple task 
participants prematurely sample evidence before the light appears, whereas the choice task they 
only sample evidence discriminating the choice after they detect the onset of the light (see  
Supplementary Materials for further discussion). 
Comparison of 14 Wald Simple Detection Models 
We refit the selected model (i.e., with start-point noise and with load effects on the 
probability of omission, rates, thresholds and non-decision time) and 6 variants that dropped one 
or two effects of load (except pf, which always varied with load) with the lower bound on non-
decision time set to 0.05s, but otherwise used the same priors as the initial fits. We did this also 
with the set same set of 7 models except we fixed start-point nose at zero. We used the same 
conventions to designate models: the most complex model, Bvt0, has 13 parameters with start-
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point noise and 12 without. With start-point noise the three further models dropped the load 
effect from one parameter, vt0, Bt0, and Bv, had 11, 11, and 12 parameters, respectively and one 
less each without start-point noise. Similarly, the final three models had a load effect on only one 
parameter, B, v, and t0, had 10, 10 and 9 parameters respectively and one less each without start-
point noise.  
Table 4. The difference between DIC and the DIC for the best (Bvt0 with start-point noise) model 
(DIC = -3599) and corresponding model weights for the set of 14 models.  
  Bvt0 Bv Bt0 vt0 B v t0 
Start-point 
noise 
DIC difference 0 193 316 483 855 957 2553 
Model Weight .9988 0 0 0 0 0 0 
No start-point 
noise 
DIC difference 14 194 244 507 866 965 2578 
Model Weight .0012 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
As shown in the Supplementary Materials, our results were consistent with the parameter 
analyses reported below in confirming load effects on all three parameters to be reliable (i.e., all 
models that dropped one or more effect were worse), both with and without start-point noise. 
The DIC for the selected model was very similar to the initial fit of this model, and analyses of 
parameter replicated a very similar pattern of p values.  
Comparison of 7 Wald Choice Models 
We again refit the selected model (i.e., with no start-point noise but with load effects on 
the probability of omission, rates, thresholds and non-decision time) and 6 variants that dropped 
one or two effects of load (except pf, which always varied with load). To check the robustness 
and generality of our initial results all refits reduced the lower bound on non-decision time to 
0.05s, but otherwise used the same priors as the initial fits. We denote models by parameters that 
vary with load, so the most complex model is Bvt0. Three further models dropped the load effect 
from one parameter: vt0, Bt0, and Bv, with 14, 12, and 15 parameters respectively. The final three 
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models had a load effect on only one parameter, B, v, and t0, with 11, 13 and 10 parameters 
respectively.  
As shown in the Supplementary Materials, our results were consistent with the parameter 
analyses reported below in confirming load effects on all three parameters to be reliable (i.e., all 
models that dropped one or more effect were worse than the most complex Bvt0 model). The 
sizes of the reductions in DIC suggest the non-decision time effect was least important, with the 
rate and threshold effects being equally important. The DIC for the model with all three effects 
was very similar to the initial fit of this model, and analyses of parameter replicated a very 
similar pattern of p values.  
Table 5. The difference between DIC and the DIC for the best (Bvt0) model (DIC = 10483) and 
corresponding model weights for the set of seven models.  
 Bvt0 Bv Bt0 vt0 B v t0 
DIC difference 0 14 23 23 45 69 162 
Model Weight 0.9991 0.0009 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Parameter Tests 
We report results about parameter estimates as posterior medians with 95% credible 
intervals given in square brackets and focus on the effects of load using Bayesian p-values to test 
differences in parameters between conditions (e.g., Matzke, Dolan, Batchelder &Wagenmakers, 
2015; Matzke et al., 2017; Klauer, 2010; see supplementary materials for computational details). 
This p value is directly interpretable as the probability that one parameter is greater than another 
for the sample of subjects, so that a difference can be indicated by small or large p. However, 
given the familiar convention of low p values supporting a difference, we report the tail area 
such that small values are consistent with the stated effect direction. 
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Simple DRT. The response omission parameter (pf) was 1.1%, [.37, 1.79] higher (6.1%, 
[5.6, 6.6] vs. 5.0%, [4.51, 5.50], p = .002), and non-decision time (t0) was 0.023 s [.013, .032] 
faster (0.152 s, [.145, .158] vs. 0.175 s [.168, .180], p < .001) in the load-present condition than 
in the load-absent condition. The response threshold (b) was higher in the load-present than load-
absent condition for both bright blocks (by 0.31, [.25, .36]: 1.13, [1.08, 1.18] vs. 0.83, [.78, .87], 
p < .001) and dim blocks (by 0.39, [.33, .44]: 1.20, [1.15, 1.24] vs. 0.81, [.77, .86], p < .001). The 
mean rate was clearly lower in the load-present than the load-absent condition for both bright 
blocks [.43, .69] (3.32, [3.21, 3.44] vs. 2.80, [2.68, 2.85], p < .001) and dim blocks [.06, .29] 
(2.91, [2.81, 2.99] vs. 2.72, [2.64, 2.81], p < .001).  
Choice DRT. The proportion of response omissions was 2.1%, [1.41, 2.81] higher (3.4%, 
[2.90, 4.00] vs. 1.3%, [1.03, 1.71], p < .001), non-decision time was 0.031 s [.012, .051] faster 
(.218 s, [.201, .227] vs. 0.249 s, [.234, .263], p < .001), and the average response threshold was 
0.27 [.200, .344] higher (2.1, [2.06, 4.15] vs. 1.83, [1.77, 1.89], p < .001) in the load-present 
condition than in the load-absent condition. The mean rate for the matching accumulator was 
clearly lower [.06, .24] in the load-present condition (2.32, [2.26, 2.38] vs. 2.46, [2.40, 2.53], p < 
.001), whereas the mismatching rate was a little higher [.003, .21] in the load-present condition 
(1.34, [1.27, 1.40] vs. 1.23, [1.16, 1.31], p = .02), so the difference between match and mismatch 
rates was much smaller [.15, .35] for the load-present condition than the load-absent condition 
(0.98, [.91, 1.05] vs. 1.23, [1.16, 1.30], p < .001). 
Simple vs. Choice. We also compared the size of the selected models’ load effects in 
simple and choice DRTs. There was no support for a decrease in the non-decision time load 
effect for simple compared to choice DRT (M = .008 s, p = .23, [-.03, .013]). However, there was 
some support for a larger threshold effect in the simple DRT (M = .073, p = .05, [-.015, .16]) and 
strong support for a larger rate effect (M = .226, p = .001, [.096, .35]). 
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The Underlying Causes of Load Effects  
We used model selection to further test the necessity of rate, threshold and non-decision 
time effects in accounting for performance in both the simple and choice DRT (see 
supplementary materials for details). For the choice DRT we fit six simplifications of the 
selected models that removed the load effect on one or more parameters, and we compared the 
models using DIC. The analyses confirmed the results of the Bayesian p-value analyses, 
selecting the model allowing for load effects on accumulation rates, thresholds and non-decision 
time. We repeated this exercise for the simple DRT, using models both with and without start-
point variability, and both confirmed the need for all three causes of the load effect and for the 
need for start-point noise.  
We performed further analyses on the selected models in order to provide a more fine-
grained quantitative understanding of the importance of each parameter in explaining the effects 
of load on speed, and for the choice DRT on accuracy. This is fairly straightforward for non-
decision time, because it exclusively effects mean RT. In both simple and choice DRT the 
increased RT under load due to both higher thresholds and lower accumulation rates was masked 
somewhat by non-decision time, which decreased under load. In the simple DRT, it reduced the 
underlying load effect (i.e., the effect due to rate and threshold differences between load 
conditions) of 0.195 s by around 24% to the observed 0.148 s value. In the choice DRT it 
reduced the underlying 0.141 s mean RT load effect by a similar proportion, 22%, to the 
observed value of 0.11 s. 
In order to quantify the effects of rate and threshold differences we modified the posterior 
parameter estimates from the selected models in two ways. First, we set the threshold parameters 
for the load-present and load-absent conditions to the same value, the average of the freely 
estimated parameters in the selected models. We then simulated data from this model and 
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calculated the predicted load effects in mean RT and, for the choice data, in accuracy, enabling 
us to quantify the effect of the remaining rate differences between load conditions. Second, we 
did the same but with rate parameters for load-present and load-absent conditions being set to 
their mean. Of the underlying 0.195 s simple DRT mean RT effect, around 0.12 s (60%) was due 
to the higher threshold in the load-present condition and the remaining 0.075 s to mean rate 
differences.   
For the choice DRT, approximately the same length time, 0.12 s, but a larger proportion 
(85%) of the underlying 0.141 s underlying effect on mean RT was due to the threshold 
difference, with the remaining 0.021 s due to differences in mean rate. For the choice DRT, rate 
differences had a large effect on accuracy, increasing it in the load-absent over the load-present 
condition by 5.65%. However, this difference in accuracy was reduced 1.9% by the increase in 
threshold in the load-present condition, producing the observed value of 3.75% greater accuracy 
in the load-absent than the load-present condition.     
Model Parameter and Pursuit Tracking Correlations 
In order to relate steering performance and model parameter differences, we utilized 
plausible-value correlations (Ly et al., 2017). These are a fully Bayesian way to test correlations 
between subject-level covariates and hierarchical parameter estimates (the latter being the 
“plausible values”). The parameters came from the selected Wald models of both the choice and 
simple DRT, and the subject covariates are RMSE steering error for each participant. This 
analysis provides two sorts of estimates, and corresponding inferential procedures, assuming 
either a fixed-effects approach with inference specific to the sample of participants or a random-
effects approach appropriate for generalizing inference to a new sample of participants. The 
latter approach provides a much more stringent test and so we focus on it, with details of all 
results provided in supplementary materials.  
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We analyzed correlations between RMSE and the posterior distributions of threshold (B), 
rate (v), omission rate (pf), and non-decision time (t0) separately in the load-present and load-
absent conditions. For the choice model, we performed correlations with B averaged across the 
dim and bright light accumulators, with both the difference between matching and mismatching 
accumulator rates (as a measure of the quality of evidence), and with the rate for the matching 
accumulator (which is most strongly related to the speed of correct responses and most directly 
analogous to the simple DRT rate). As for the previous modeling methods, 95% credible 
intervals are given in square brackets. Bayesian p-values are based on the distribution of 
posterior parameter estimates of correlations with RMSE. In order to maintain the convention 
that smaller p-values support the existence of differences, we give the probability of a correlation 
being greater than zero for negative correlations, and the probability of a correlation being less 
than zero for positive correlations; A p near zero value supports there being a strong negative or 
positive relationship and a p value near .5 supports there being no relationship. 
For the choice data there was a clear negative correlation between steering error and the 
rate for the matching accumulator in the load-present condition, r(17) = -.61, [-.86, -.24], p = 
.003. The analogous correlation for the load-absent condition was moderately large, but its 95% 
credible included zero, r(17) = -.40, [-.75, .05], p = .041. The same was true for a negative 
correlation with the difference between match and mismatch rates in the load-present condition, 
r(17) = -.41, [.78, .02], p = .031 and for a positive correlation with the omission probability (pf) 
parameter in the load-present condition, r(17) = .45, [-.01, .77], p = .028. Correlations with non-
decision times and threshold were generally weak. 
For the simple DRT a negative correlation with mean rate was present with the dim 
stimulus for the load-present condition r(17) = -.46, [-.78, -.03], p = .021, analogous to the 
results in the choice DRT. This correlation was weaker for the bright (i.e., ISO standard) DRT, 
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r(17) = -.38, [-.73, .07], p = .051. The same was true for those correlations in the load-absent 
conditions for both the dim DRT, r(17) = -.42, [-.76, .03], p = .036 and the bright DRT, r(17) 
= -.41, [-.75, .04], p = .039. For the bright DRT the strongest finding was a negative correlation 
with the non-decision time in the load-absent condition, r(17) = -.45, [-.77, -.01], p = .024. The 
analogous correlation was of similar magnitude but a little weaker for the dim DRT, r(17) = -.41, 
[-.75, .03], p = .035, as were the correlations with non-decision time in the load-present condition 
for both the bright r(17) = -.36, [-.72, .09], p = .057, and dim r(17) = -.38, [-.73, .07], p = .051 
DRTs. For both bright and dim DRTs correlations with thresholds and omission probability were 
weak.  
General Discussion 
 It is a fundamental characteristic of human cognition that dividing attention between two 
or more tasks results in performance decrements (i.e., slower and more error-prone behavior) 
compared to when each task is performed separately. The International Standards Organization 
developed the DRT (ISO DIS 17488, 2015) to assesses cognitive workload in a variety of 
multitasking situations. DRT reaction time and omission rates are very sensitive to increases in 
cognitive workload; however, the precise reason is unclear. This sensitivity could be due to 
cognitive-capacity related changes in the rate of evidence accumulation, or to a strategic 
adjustment in the threshold amount of information required to trigger a response, changes in non-
decision time (i.e., the time to encode a stimulus and to produce a response), or some 
combination of these factors. These distinctions could meaningfully change the approaches to 
applications of studying cognitive workload, such as alleviating driver distraction. For example, 
approaches that target attention allocation from a limited-resource perspective would be 
validated with a demonstration of rate effects. Threshold effects may call into question current 
assumptions about cognitive workload, and subsequently shift focus toward individual 
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differences in strategic decision making. Increased non-decision time effects would imply 
cognitive workload is mainly due to early processing or subsequent motor interference. The 
current research used formal modeling to identify the bases for changes in DRT performance 
with increased cognitive workload.  
We found that in both choice and simple DRTs the cognitive workload induced by a 
secondary task of counting backward by threes (while also performing a primary steering task) 
reduced evidence accumulation rates. These results suggest that information processing in choice 
and simple DRTs depends on the same limited pool of attention capacity as the secondary task. 
To our knowledge, this is the first direct confirmation that cognitive workload, as traditionally 
measured by a dual-task methodology, affects evidence accumulation rates. This finding was 
bolstered by its consistency in two modeling frameworks: the shifted Wald (Heathcote, 2004, 
Logan et al., 2014), and the LBA (Brown & Heathcote, 2008, see supplementary materials), and 
by its consistency between the ISO DRT using a bright light and two variants: either requiring 
detection of a dim light or requiring a binary choice between bright and dim lights. It confirms 
Strayer et al.’s (2011, 2015) interpretation of correlations between the DRT and effects of 
secondary tasks on driving performance as being at least in part mediated by limited-capacity 
attention.  
These results support the dominant assumption that cognitive workload effects reflect a 
competition for limited resources. Further supporting the notion of capacity sharing, the choice 
DRT clearly reduced performance in the pursuit-tracking task. This was also true to a lesser 
degree for simple DRT using a dim light, with the smallest, but still reliable, impact being 
produced by the ISO DRT using a bright light. As well as confirming the notion that the DRT 
draws on the same limited-capacity attention pool as the primary and secondary tasks, it also 
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confirms that the ISO DRT with an easily detected stimulus is best suited to minimize the impact 
of measuring cognitive workload during driving.  
Increased cognitive workload also causes an increase in DRT response omissions, that is, 
failures to respond to the present DRT stimulus before the onset of the next DRT stimulus. It was 
clear in our data that omissions were not simply due to slow responses coming from the same 
process producing observed DRT responses, as the distribution of observed DRT responses 
terminated well before the next stimulus appeared. We accounted for response omissions by 
assuming a mixture of normal Wald evidence accumulation processes and failures to encode the 
DRT stimulus. Our results imply that this encoding failure process is sensitive to cognitive 
workload.  
Ratcliff and Strayer (2014) took a different approach to omissions, using a Wald model, 
but assuming Gaussian trial-to-trial variability that sometimes results in negative accumulation 
rates and hence response omissions, because the accumulated evidence cannot reach the positive 
threshold. However, this came at a cost. The model has no closed-form likelihood, so had to be 
fit by slow simulation-based methods. More importantly, it has problems with parameter 
identification in the simple DRT, meaning it cannot adjudicate whether a threshold effect, a rate 
effect, or both, mediate slowing. We demonstrated our model does not suffer from the same 
problems. In supplementary materials we report extensive parameter-recovery (Heathcote et al., 
2015) simulations, which show that the Wald model produces quite accurate and precise 
estimates of parameters relevant to cognitive workload effects with samples as small as 200 trials 
per participant. This makes our model practical to apply to an ISO DRT recorded over a duration 
as short as 15 minutes. These outcomes increase the feasibility of applying evidence-
accumulation modeling techniques to cognitive workload measurement in a wide range of 
behavioral tasks for both laboratory and applied settings.     
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Contrary to our initial hypothesis, we found a small but reliable decrease in non-decision 
time under cognitive workload. This may have been compensatory in nature, slightly offsetting 
(by about ~20%) slowing due to threshold increases and rate decreases. Palada, Neal, Tay and 
Heathcote (2018) also found that high cognitive workloads could sometimes be associated with 
reduced non-decision time in a difficult choice task. They suggested that fast non-decision times 
were associated with a degraded encoding. It is possible that such a degraded encoding process 
might in part be responsible for the reduced rate of evidence accumulation we observed under 
cognitive workload (as a weakened stimulus encoding weakens the evidence on which the rate is 
based). However, for Palada et al. the decrease in non-decision time was more extreme, it was 
associated with a drastic decrease in accuracy specific to one type of choice response, and only 
occurred under extreme time pressure that caused participants to run out of time to respond to 
some of the multiple stimuli they had to respond to in each display. Hence, further research is 
required to determine if the same mechanism is in play in the very different task setup used here.     
We found a clear increase in both simple and choice DRT thresholds due to a secondary-
task workload. Tillman et al. (2017) also found conversation on a hands-free cell-phone caused 
an increase in threshold in the Wald model of the ISO DRT. However, they did not find any 
effect of this secondary task on accumulation rates or non-decision time, despite its well-
documented deleterious effects on a primary driving task. They suggested their DRT slowing and 
threshold increase was an indirect result of a general tendency to be more cautious when making 
responses in more demanding situations. It seems likely that the same mechanism may have been 
at play in our results. However, in contrast to Tillman et al., we found that a little less than half 
of the slowing due to load was due to a decreased rate of evidence accumulation in the simple 
DRT. In contrast, our results in the choice DRT were more in line with theirs, with threshold 
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effects explaining the majority (~85%) of the slowing, although even in this case we obtained 
clear evidence for a reliable rate effect.  
Once again, these results support the use of a simple DRT as best for measuring cognitive 
workload, as it better reflects accumulation rate effects that indicate a decrease in available 
attention capacity that could affect driving performance.  At a theoretical level, the divergence 
between our results and those of Tillman et al. (2017) clearly indicates slowing in the DRT is not 
by itself sufficient to make inferences about underlying causes. Fortunately, our model provides 
a practical and efficient way to make such inferences in future research. We provide the software 
necessary to do so through the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/e8kag/). 
Correlations between parameter distributions and pursuit tracking error provided further 
evidence of a relationship between accumulation rates and driving performance. Accumulation 
rates in choice and simple DRTs correlated negatively with steering performance, whereas we 
did not find evidence to support a correlation between thresholds and steering performance. 
These results demonstrate a relationship between individuals with less cognitive capacity (as 
reflected in lower DRT accumulation rates) having higher steering errors, particularly under 
more demanding high-load conditions and with the more demanding dim and choice DRTs. The 
weaker correlations for the less demanding ISO DRT reinforce our finding that it has a lesser 
impact on the steering task.  
In summary, the DRT has been shown to be very sensitive to dynamic changes in 
cognitive workload in a variety of multitasking contexts (e.g., Strayer, Biondi, & Cooper, 2017).  
Here, we have provided a theoretical account for what aspects of information processing are 
captured by the technique. The DRT is particularly slowed with cognitive workload due to a 
decrease in the rate of evidence accumulation, an effect that is substantially accentuated by an 
increase in the amount of evidence required to trigger a response but somewhat masked by a 
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decrease in non-decision time. In terms of applications to distracted driving, these findings 
support strategies and policies that optimize a driver’s allocation of limited resources to the road. 
However, they also suggest there is scope for improving driving performance by encouraging 
compensatory strategies that give non-driving tasks lower priorities through changing the amount 
of information required to make the associated choices and/or by making it easier to encode 
information for the non-driving tasks, and through training to decrease motor production times 
for the associated responses.  
In closing, this research provides a framework for accurately quantifying cognitive 
workload and the factors that contribute to it, which will allow future researchers and policy 
makers to determine the danger inherent in many tasks within the vehicle. Additionally, it is 
possible that future experimental manipulations will alter the information processing dynamics 
underlying the DRT. The formal modeling described herein will assist in identifying changes to 
the factors underlying cognitive workload and allow this framework to be flexibly applied across 
multiple paradigms.   
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